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DISCLOSURE AS CONSUMER
PROTECTION: UNIT PURCHASERS' NEED
FOR ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS
VINCENT DI LORENZO*
INTRODUCTION
Law is viewed as a dynamic system, evolving in response to
changing conditions and experience. At times, however, legisla-
tive enactments become static-not responsive to change or to
the lessons of experience. The New York statutes governing the
creation of cooperative and condominium unit developments
have fallen into this static mode. Over the years, changes have
been made in protections afforded nonpurchasing tenants' but
the balance of the statutes have remained largely impervious to
changing circumstances, particularly changes experienced by
unit purchasers in the last decade. This article examines the
need to rethink the legislative approach taken in New York to-
ward protection of unit purchasers in offerings of condominiums
and cooperatives-a full disclosure approach.
Part One of this Article studies the embrace of full disclo-
sure as the legislative approach to protect unit purchasers. The
findings are that the embrace was without much forethought. In
addition, this approach has prevented the imposition of sub-
stantive protections by administrative regulation. Finally, the
legislature has not subsequently reconsidered its approach, and
instead has become path dependent.
Part Two explores the deficiencies of a pure disclosure ap-
proach in protecting unit purchasers. The New York experience
since 1985 is the focus of the study. The findings are that the
" Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I wish to thank Flor-
ence Fisher, Queens League of United Tenants, and James Lanza, Queens Co-
op/Condo Coalition, for their assistance.
'See infra text accompanying note 17 (discussing changes to New York statutes
governing nonpurchasing tenants).
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statute permits the unit purchaser to be placed at risk, unit pur-
chasers have in fact been placed at risk, and disclosure has not
served to protect them-either directly or indirectly, e.g., via the
oversight of interested and experienced institutional partici-
pants.
PART ONE-FULL DISCLOSURE: CHANCE AND PATH DEPENDENCE
A. Theoretical Foundations
This article is a study of human decision making in the co-
op--condominium context. In Part One, I explore legislative de-
cisions. In Part Two, I explore individual human decisions. Pro-
fessor Mark Roe recently studied corporate governance issues
and suggested a refinement of the classical evolutionary model
from law and economics "to accommodate three related concepts
-one from chaos theory, another of path dependence, and a final
one from modern evolutionary theory."2 A similar approach can
form the basis for a study of legislative outcomes.
Chaos theorists have documented the existence of chance in
choices among possible outcomes faced by physical systems,3 and
opined a similar role for chance in human decisions.4 In physical
systems the role of chance is the random choice which may occur
at bifurcation points.5 In human decisions, particularly in the
legislative arena, choices are rarely random. Some explanation
is offered or can be surmised. Randomness, therefore, should be
2 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 641 (1996).
* Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, for example, discuss outcomes in physics
in these terms:
The "historical" path along which the system evolves as the control pa-
rameter grows is characterized by a succession of stable regions, where de-
terministic laws dominate, and of instable ones, near the bifurcation
points, where the system can "choose" between or among more than one
possible future. Both the deterministic character of the kinetic equations
whereby the set of possible states and their respective stability can be cal-
culated, and the random fluctuations "choosing" between or among the
states around bifurcation points are inextricably connected. This mixture
of necessity and chance constitutes the history of the system.
ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS 169-170 (1984). In
legislative decision-making the decision to embrace a legislative approach would be
a bifurcation point.
4 See DAVID RUELLE, CHANCE AND CHAOS 90 (1991) (explaining how even ra-
tional decisions people make contain an irrational element).
5See PRIGOGINE & STENGERS, supra note 3; RUELLE, supra note 4.
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judged with reference to the purpose of the statute. If a choice is
motivated by a desire to best serve the purpose of the enactment,
then I would not characterize it as a product of chance. If the
choice is not so motivated, however, I would characterize it as a
product of chance.
Path dependence maps onto an initial legislative choice. As
Professor Roe suggested:
Path dependence could explain the forms we see. Multiple,
equally efficient results might abound and path dependence-
paths shaped by a nation's political and cultural institutions, or
chaotic chance events-could determine which among equally
efficient end results we have. Or path dependence could permit
structures that were once satisfactory to become inefficient but
not be worth changing, thus rendering the path-determined
structures regrettable even though they are left intact. Or path
dependence could lead to highly inefficient structures that soci-
ety cannot eliminate.6
Professor Roe views true path dependence as a decision to
retain a particular approach or structure even though it yields
inefficient results. I would take a different view. I would focus
on the purpose of the particular enactment. If the approach or
structure retained by the legislature poorly serves the purpose of
the enactment, I would characterize its retention as path de-
pendence.
Finally, modern evolutionary theory questions incremental
change and instead recognizes the existence of sudden change in
response to crisis.' The legislative arena has experienced this
same phenomena. Small changes have sometimes surfaced-
changes which are departures from existing legislative paths.
However, the metaphor of evolutionary theory alerts us not to
assume that such small changes will be repeated and lead to an
incremental evolution.
B. The New York Legislative Response
In 1960, the New York State Legislature was asked to
choose a legislative approach for the protection of purchasers in
offerings of cooperative and condominium units.8 The choice was
6 Roe, supra note 2, at 646-47.
7 See id. at 663 ("Institutions and rules would be comparatively rigid until a
shock hit the system....").8 New York did not adopt a condominium enabling statute until 1964, although
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incorporated into the state's blue sky law (the Martin Act) and
was a disclosure approach--full disclosure of risks and unit pur-
chasers' self-protection by analysis of risks. As early as 1926,
the purpose of the Martin Act was stated as being "to prevent all
kinds of fraud in connection with the sale of securi-
ties... whereby the public is fraudulently exploited."'0 The ad-
dition of the registration and disclosure requirements in 1960
was meant to serve this same purpose."
In 1988, the New York Court of Appeals confirmed what was
long suspected-that the New York statute permitted the Attor-
ney General to impose solely disclosure obligations and not sub-
stantive obligations, unless they were specifically imposed by the
legislature.' Many states applied the disclosure approach to the
emerging unit ownership offering phenomena, although it was
not universally adopted. California, for example, adopted an ap-
proach in which regulatory authorities sought to ensure suitabil-
ity of a project for its intended use, fair dealing, and full disclo-
sure.' 3  The disclosure approach is also an approach which
contrasts with the warranty protections New York enacted, more
recently, for purchasers of newly constructed residential real es-
tate.
14
other states enacted such statutes prior to this date. See 1964 N.Y. Laws 82.
9See 1960 N.Y. Laws 987. The only substantive protection on the 1960 legisla-
tion was a requirement that moneys received from unit purchasers in connection
with an offering be held in trust until consummation of the transaction. See id. at §
352-h.
'0 People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926).
'" See Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Abrams, 531 N.E.2d 627 (N.Y.
1988) (noting that New York's disclosure statute is intended to protect the public
from fraudulent exploitation in the sale of real estate securities); All Seasons Re-
sorts v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 38 (N.Y. 1986) (deciding whether campground
membership fell within the definition of a security so as to require registration);
People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, Inc., 330 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (stating that
all acts tending to defraud the public fall within the scope of the Martin Act).
12 See Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc., 531 N.E.2d at 629 (invalidating
regulations requiring sponsors to cure all building violations of record and eliminate
all dangerous or hazardous conditions); see also Council for Owner Occupied Hous.,
Inc. v. Abrams, 511 N.Y.S.2d 966 (App. Div. 1987) (requiring sponsors to remove or
treat asbestos in a related proceeding).
1" See JOHN PAUL HANNA, CALIFORNIA CONDOMINIUM HANDBOOK 2D § 10.1 (2d
ed. 1986).
14 See 1988 N.Y. Laws 709. The statute applies to single family homes or units
in a multi-unit residential structure of five stores or less. Thus, some condominium
and cooperative offerings would be subject to the statute. The statute's warranties
relate to physical defects, and not the terms of the offering regarding condominium
or cooperative units, such as conditions of financing or minimum sales require-
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Why was disclosure the legislative choice? The 1960 legis-
lation was a response to abuses in the sale of real estate syndi-
cations-not cooperative unit offerings." The bill was part of the
Attorney General's program bills. However, the Attorney Gen-
eral's memorandum to the Governor does not even mention coop-
erative unit offerings. 6 Cooperative unit offerings were not the
subject of the impetus for action and did not draw any attention
from interest groups. 7 Real estate syndication offerings are in-
vestment contracts, which, like other securities, have typically
been subject to a disclosure approach for the protection of pur-
chasers in federal and other states' securities laws. 8 In other
words, the New York decision reflects the history of the system
of securities regulation generally. Cooperative unit offerings
were added to the list of covered "securities" in the proposed
legislation due to the decision of the Chief of the Securities and
Real Estate Financing Bureau, who had witnessed abuses in
sales of section 213 cooperatives. This policy advocate happened
to be in charge of the state bureau responsible for both securities
fraud and real estate fraud. Cooperative unit offerings are
structured as stock offerings and, therefore, seemed reasonably
subject to a disclosure approach in order to protect unit purchas-
ers. Finally, there was a political realization that an addition to
an existing bill-a bill which had, after earlier opposition, re-
ceived the support of the real estate syndication industry-would
facilitate action on the cooperative offerings measure.
This exploration of the history of the 1960 enactment indi-
cates that the choice to subject cooperative offerings to the same
approach as syndication offerings was not a deliberated choice by
the legislature. However, it was considered and embraced by the
policy advocate for the bill as a means of protecting unit pur-
chasers. In that sense the choice was made without much study
and forethought, but was not a random choice at a bifurcation
ments. See generally VINCENT DI LORENzO, NEW YORK CONDOMINIUM AND CO-
OPERATIVE LAW § 5:14 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing implied warranty in new home
sales).
'5 See Memorandum of the State Dep't of Law for the Governor (Apr. 5, 1960), in
Governor's Bill Jacket to 1960 N.Y. Laws 987, at 1-2.
' See id.
17 See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L.
& POLVY REV. 425, 447-49 (1994) (discussing the dynamics which led to the passage
of the 1960 legislation).
18 See id.
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point. In addition, while not deliberated by the legislative body,
full disclosure could have been viewed in 1960 as an effective
mechanism to protect unit purchasers against abuses in unit of-
ferings. As such, the initial choice of approach was not merely
the product of path dependence. In the last ten years, the effec-
tiveness of such an approach in serving the purpose of the Mar-
tin Act-to protect unit purchasers-has been cast into serious
doubt. The legislature's refusal to modify the earlier choice of
path could now be viewed as a product of path dependence.
California's contrasting embrace of a fairness approach re-
flects the history of the system in California, but also reflects
more of a deliberated choice. 9 California's blue sky law already
had a history of requiring fairness in the terms of the offerings,
rather than merely full disclosure.20 However, California specifi-
cally studied the various approaches which could be the basis for
protection of unit purchasers in condominium offerings.2 ' There
was a recognition that the complexity of condominium offerings
and the degree of risks assumed by unit purchasers required the
fairness approach to be adopted for condominium offerings as
well, rather than the caveat emptor approach reflected in pure
disclosure statutes.2
In form, cooperative offerings are offerings of stock (plus a
proprietary lease), although in substance they are offerings of
ownership of real estate.2 In 1964, when the condominium
enabling statute was being considered by the New York legisla-
ture, both the form and substance of the transaction was an
ownership of real estate. However, disclosure, the choice previ-
ously embraced in 1960 for cooperatives, was the legislative ap-
'9 See Herbert E. Wenig & Royce H. Schulz, Government Regulation of Condo-
minium in California, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 222, 231 (1963) (detailing the structure of
California's corporate securities law).
20 See id.
21 See generally Philip J. Gregory, The California Condominium Bill, 14
HASTINGS L.J. 189 (1963) (describing the specific focus on the approach to be taken
to regulate condominium offerings); see also Wenig & Schulz, supra note 19
(discussing the three approaches which have been taken to condominium offerings
under existing law, and the choice needed to be made in proposed legislation).
22 See Wenig & Schulz, supra note 19, at 238.
"See Barry Rabinovich, Note, No-Buy Pledges: Effects of Inadequate Disclosure
and the Role of the Attorney General, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 1033 (1984) (citing 2
PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A.. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.01(5) (1978)).
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proach followed.24 Again, there was little or no deliberation re-
garding the usefulness of this approach for this newly emerging
real estate interest. The discussion in the Governor's Bill Jacket
dealt with the need for enabling legislation and the decisions to
be made regarding the structure of the condominium and the
condominium association which was created.' There was almost
no discussion of the protections required, if any, at the offering
stage.26 The one exception, which is in part a protection at the
offering stage, was the prohibition against common liens except
with the unanimous consent of unit owners. The Legislative
Memoranda accompanying the bill explained that this would
lower the risk faced by a unit owner by eliminating a major
source of financial interdependence.' Interestingly, even this
action was not intended as an incremental evolution from a pure
disclosure approach. Rather, at the time, the almost uniform
state legislative response to financing of condominium develop-
ments was to prohibit common liens without unit owner con-
sent.
Subsequent legislative activity did occur in New York. It
was in response to crises. There was a nine year period of legis-
lative turbulence, 1974-1983, with interim equilibrium points in
1974 and 1977-78. The crises concerned evictions of nonpurchas-
ing tenants. The response was directed at that problem, and not
at the possible need for additional protections for unit purchas-
ers beyond disclosure."0 The first crisis response was in 1974
when, among other things, the Martin Act was amended to re-
quire 35% of tenants to purchase before an existing residential
24 See 1964 N.Y. Laws 82 § 339-ee. This approach was sought by the same advo-
cate in the Attorney General's Office who sought to subject cooperative offerings to
disclosure requirements in 1960. See also Di Lorenzo, supra note 17, at 450.
See Preliminary Report Joint Legislative Committee on Housing and Urban
Development on 1963 New York Condominium Bill (Oct. 24, 1963), in Governor's
Bill Jacket to 1964 N.Y. Laws 82.
2' See id.
27 See id.
2 See Memorandum of Joint Legislative Committee on Hous. and Urban Dev.,
1964 New York Laws 1839.
2 See James L. Casey, Note, Board of Managers'Authority to Borrow Money, 48
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1122, 1128-29 (1974) (noting that Alabama and New Jersey have
condominium blanket mortgage statutes, but enabling legislation in other jurisdic-
tions requires consent of the unit owners).
20 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 17, at 452-54 (discussing the motivations behind
the 1974 legislation and forces which led to its passage). Curiously, unit owner
groups actually opposed the legislation because it would discourage conversions.
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building could be converted to cooperative or condominium
status."1 The second crisis response was in 1978 and 1979, and
was again in response to evictions faced by tenants, including
senior citizens. The 1974 legislation expired in 1977 by its
terms. In 1978, a revised statute aimed at protecting tenants
was enacted. 2 It retained a 35% tenant purchase requirement
only if nonpurchasers were to be evicted. 3 In noneviction plans,
a 15% purchase requirement was codified.' The only explana-
tion for the choice of the 15% figure was that a project was not
viable unless at least 15% of the units were sold. 5 The purpose
was a "viable" project-meaning one in which there was at least
some evidence of marketability of the units. The decision that
15% would be the measure of viability was one negotiated by the
Attorney General's Office with a developer (who wished to de-
clare a plan effective upon sale of only one unit) before the 15%
requirement was codified." It was then grafted onto the 1978-79
legislation. The choice was a compromise measure in exchange
for legislative sanction for eviction plans with sales of only 35%
of units to tenants, rather than a majority of units.
The legislative choice of a 15% figure is an example of what
Prigogine and Stengers would call decisions at bifurcation points
based on the history of the system and also on chance. The his-
tory of the system was the Attorney General's view of the mini-
mum requirement for a viable entity. The existence of chance, as
that term is applied in this article, was due to the fact that the
legislative embrace was not based on a conclusion that the choice
31 See 1974 N.Y. Laws 1021.
32 See 1978 N.Y. Laws 544 (making the statue applicable in Nassau, Westches-
ter and Rockland Counties, at local option). The legislative findings contained in the
Acts stated that "it is sound public policy to encourage... conversions while, at the
same time, protecting tenants in possession who do not desire or are unable to pur-
chase." Id. at § 1; see also 1979 N.Y. Laws 432 § 1 (applying this provision in the
City of New York).
See 1978 N.Y. Laws 544.
34 See id.
3" See New York State Comm'n on Rental Hous., Study of Conversion of Resi-
dential Properties to Cooperative or Condominium Status, reprinted in 3A PATRICK
ROHAN & MELVIN RESIUN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 3A-16.9 and § 3A-
16.121 (1998) (Attorney General's practice before codification of the 15% purchase
standard); see also Richard J. Meislin, Albany Officials Debate Extension of Law on
Apartment Conversions, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1977, at 42 ("[Rleal-estate interests
feel that 15 to 20 percent approval is realistic on financial grounds.").
36 See Interview with Daniel A.- Furlong, Principal Attorney, New York State
Dep't of Law, 1970-81, in Jamaica, New York (Oct. 23, 1997).
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would best serve the purpose of the statute. Rather, it was
based initially on a negotiated outcome with a developer (and
thus, in part, an arbitrary choice) at a time when no minimum
sale was required by law and, when followed in the legislative
enactment, was based on political compromise, a minimum fig-
ure establishing viability in exchange for some tenant veto power
over evictions.
The third crisis response occurred in 1982-83. At the time,
the legislature faced a large number of protests due to a large
number of conversions that resulted in evictions of tenants under
a system in which a 35% minority decided the fate of all." In
this period, tenants were again protected by legislative change,
which now imposed a requirement that 51% of units must be
sold to tenants before nonpurchasing tenants could be evicted.38
The 15% sales requirement for non-eviction plans was not
changed.
Response to crisis does not always occur in the legislative
arena. There exists a complex mix of factors which lead to action
or inaction at any point in time. This has been the subject of my
earlier work. This article does not examine the causes. It ex-
amines the outcome-inaction in response to crisis faced by unit
purchasers in the late 1980s, evidencing path dependence. This
is documented in Part Two.
PART TWO-A PURE DISCLOSURE APPROACH: UNIT PURCHASERS
AT RISK
In this article, the deficiencies of a pure disclosure approach
'7 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 17, at 463 (discussing the pressure exerted by ten-
ant groups on politicians to change the "undemocratic nature of the thirty-five per-
cent purchase requirement.") (citing Telephone Interview with James M. Morrissey,
Assistant Attorney General, 1982-85; Director of Real Estate Financing Bureau,
New York State Dep't of Law, 1983-85 (June 30, 1993)).
See 1982 N.Y. Laws 555 (applying to tenants in the City of New York); 1983
N.Y. Laws 402 (applying to tenants in Nassau, Westchester and Rockland Counties,
at local option). The executive memorandum accompanying the 1983 legislation
confirms that tenant protection was the aim of the legislation. See Governor's
Memorandum on Approval of ch. 402, N.Y. Laws (June 30, 1983), reprinted in 1983
N.Y. Laws 2766; see also 1982 N.Y. Laws 555 § 1 (seeking to protect non-purchasing
tenants from the public housing shortage in New York City).
39 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 17, at 432-35 (listing and explaining seven factors
that spark legislative action: policy entrepreneurs, interest group pressure, public-
ity, pervasive ideological commitment, electoral advantage, legislative pressure, and
chance).
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in protecting unit purchases is explored through the sales expe-
rience in noneviction plans. Examination of the legal and eco-
nomic environment during the past decade reveals that the coop-
erative and condominium developments which were created,
were characterized by risk. The law permitted conversions with
very few resident unit owners.40 It also combined with the eco-
nomic environment to create disincentives to further vigorous
sales. As a result, developments have been created which are
cooperative or condominium in form only, which continue to be
rental properties in substance. For the resident unit owners in
such developments, the result has been large payments (for os-
tensible unit ownership) in exchange for denial of ownership pre-
rogatives and exposure to excessive risk.41 The risk-creating en-
vironment is brought about by two related developments,
documented below-the predominance of noneviction conversions
and the declaration of effectiveness with few sales.
A. The Post-1985 Experience
1. Predominance of Noneviction Conversions
By the mid-1980s, most offering plans for cooperative or
condominium ownership were able to be declared effective only
as noneviction plans.42 This was the result of two related legal
requirements. First, the requirement that 51% of tenants in oc-
cupancy purchase the unit in order to declare a plan effective as
an eviction plan.43 Second, the requirement that for noneviction
plans, only 15% of the units must be purchased in order to de-
clare the plan effective. 44 This trend was reported as early as
40 The conversion of a building or group of buildings to a cooperative condomin-
ium, from residential rental status, was possible with as little as 15% of the units
having been purchased by bona fide tenants. See supra notes 34-35 and accompany-
ing text.
41 See Lisa S. Lim, An Overview of the Effects of Cooperative Sponsor Defaults,
21 REAL EST. L.J. 349, 356 (1993) (concluding that the interdependence between the
sponsor and the tenant shareholders exposes the latter to potential liability and the
risk of losing equity in their individual units as a result of foreclosure of the co-op's
underlying mortgage).
42 See generally Dee Wedemeyer, Protecting Those Who Buy Co-ops, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1983, § 8, at 7 (discussing trends in eviction plans).
See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eee(1)(c) (McKinney 1996).
4 See id. § 352-eee(1)(b). Within the City of New York, none of the purchasers
need to be tenants. In Nassau, Westchester and Rockland counties, purchasers must
be bona fide tenants.
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1983 by James M. Morrissey, Chief of the Real Estate Financing
Bureau of the Attorney General's Office:
Since the enactment of the new conversion statute governing
New York City, which became effective July 20, 1982, there has
been a relative decrease in eviction plans submitted and a rela-
tive increase in noneviction plans. Our records show that the
submission of eviction plans in New York City has decreased
from 343 plans involving 28,229 units in 1981 to 248 plans in-
volving 23,386 units in 1982 to 88 plans involving 7,424 units in
the first nine months of 1983. Furthermore, we find that at
least 40 to 50 percent of the plans accepted since July 20, 1982,
as eviction plans are amended to become noneviction plans be-
fore they are declared effective.45
I studied this phenomena during the five year period 1985-
1989, the last period during which significant offerings occurred
in the State of New York. The computerized Plan Listing Report
maintained by the New York State Department of Law was used
as the source for data on the number of eviction and noneviction
plans declared effective during the 1985-89 period. This is also
the five year period during which most plans facing financial
losses in the last decade were created. The Report lists indi-
vidually the status of each plan. Aggregate figures were calcu-
lated based on these individual entries. Table A contains the re-
sults. It reveals that in the 1985-89 period, noneviction plans
constituted more than 60% of the plans declared effective in 1988
and 1989, more than 50% in 1986 and 1987, and more than 46%
in 1985.
Table A
PLANS DECLARED EFFECTIVE
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Noneviction 242 303 352 430 394
Eviction 85 45 45 53 58
Vacant "Residential" and 187 247 250 222 197
"Commercial" *
4 Wedemeyer, supra note 42, at 7. This evidence deals with plans submitted.
The results reported in this article contain data concerning effective plans state-
wide. See id.
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Split Eviction **
Total Number of Plans
1 0 0 0 0
515 595 647 705 649
Noneviction Plans As Per- 46.99 50.92 54.40 60.99 60.71
centage of All Plans
* The computerized Plan Listing Report designates plans
involving property which is vacant-either newly con-
structed or rehabilitated-as "residential" or "commer-
cial".
** At one time, the sales requirements to tenants to be
achieved before declaring a plan effective as an eviction
plan was separately applied to rent stabilized units and
rent controlled units.
Moreover, as documented in Table B, in four of the five years
in question, more than 70% of all units created were done so un-
der noneviction plans.
Table B
NUMBER OF UNITS-PLANS DECLARED EFFECTIVE
1985
30,279Noneviction
Eviction
Vacant, "Residential,"
and "Commercial"
Split Eviction
Total Number of Units
Units in Noneviction
Plans
Percentage of All Units
1986 1987
25,626 38,586
1988
31,499
1989
30,199
5,484 2,556 1,344 2,311 1,524
5,971 9,062 9,938 8,389 7,363
101 0 0 0 0
41,835 37,244 49,868 42,199 39,086
72.38 68.80 77.37 74.64 77.26
2. Few Sales-the Rise of the Illusory Cooperative
In the 1985-89 period, sponsors declared many plans effec-
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tive with very few units actually sold. The New York State De-
partment of Law does not compile or report figures on sales
achieved to declare offering plans effective. To compile such fig-
ures, monthly reports on individual buildings released by Yale
Robbins, Inc. (based on individual review of each amendment to
each offering plan) were analyzed. The period analyzed was
again the five year period preceding the first reports of financial
difficulties-1985 to 1989. During this period, Yale Robbins re-
ported information on 1,082 offering plans, containing 82,938
units, which were declared effective.46 These individual entries
provided the source of information regarding the percentage of
units actually sold before plans were declared effective. Table C
contains the data which was compiled. In each year, one-half or
more of all plans were declared effective with less than 25% of
units sold. In fact, in 1988 and 1989, more than two-thirds of all
plans were declared effective with less than 25% of units sold.
Table C
PERCENTAGE OF UNITS SOLD TO DECLARE PLAN
EFFECTIVE
Year 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 50% or
19% 24% 29% 34% 49% more
1985
Number of Plans 46 48 23 7 28 36
Percentage 24.47 25.53 12.24 3.72 14.89 19.15
Number of Units 3,423 4,985 2,947 995 3,877 3,129
Percentage 17.68 25.75 15.23 5.14 20.03 16.17
1986
Number of Plans 45 28 14 9 21 22
Percentage 32.37 20.14 10.07 6.48 15.11 15.83
Number of Units 3,517 1,926 673 959 2,385 1,890
Percentage 30.99 16.97 5.93 8.45 21.01 16.65
'6 The 1,082 plans for which Yale Robbins, Inc. reported sales information rep-
resent 34.78% of all offering plans which were declared effective in the 1985-89 pe-
riod. The 82,938 units contained in such plans represent 39.45% of all units for
which plans were declared effective during that period. See The Coop/Condo Con-
version Digest Newsletter, Plans Declared Effective, Comparison of Initial and Final
Deal by Building (Yale Robbins, Inc., New York, N.Y. 1985).
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Year 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 50% or
19% 24% 29% 34% 49% more
1987
Number of Plans
Percentage
Number of Units
Percentage
1988
Number of Plans
Percentage
Number of Units
Percentage
1989
Number of Plans
Percentage
Number of Units
Percentage
59 44 25 10 25 9
34.30 25.58 14.54 5.81 14.54 5.23
5,874 6,625 2,882 921 1,937 470
31.40 35.41 15.41 4.92 10.35 2.51
101 60 29 18 18 12
42.44 25.21 12.19 7.56 7.56 5.04
8,185 3,469 1,459 946 1,042 482
52.53 22.26 9.36 6.07 6.69 3.09
121 87 37 16 22 8
41.58 29.90 12.71 5.50 7.56 2.75
7,981 5,320 1,857 1,086 1,021 675
44.49 29.66 10.35 6.05 5.69 3.76
3. Policy Implications
(a) Deny Unit Purchasers Self-Management
The rise of cooperative or condominium developments with
few resident unit owners denies such unit purchasers a voice in
self-management. At the board level, the sponsor or other non-
resident investor controls the selection of board members and
board policies. At the unit-owner level, the sponsor or other non-
resident investor controls decisions made at shareholder-unit
owner meetings. A voice in self-management has been recog-
nized as a right that is at the heart of the cooperative (or con-
dominium) form of ownership.47 As the New York Court of Ap-
47 See Vincent DiLorenzo, Restraints on Alienation in a Condominium Context:
An Evaluation and Theory for Decision Making, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 403,
420-21 (1989) (discussing reliance on owners in self-managed condominiums).
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peals explained, when sanctioning an arbitrary right of consent
for unit transfers, that "there is no reason why the owners of the
co-operative apartment house could not decide for themselves
with whom they wish to share their elevators, their common
halls and facilities, their stockholders' meetings, their manage-
ment problems and responsibilities and their homes.""
The loss of self-management is not ameliorated by legislative
protections. In New York State, there is no legislative require-
ment that the sponsor relinquish control of the board of a coop-
erative or condominium after a specified time.49
The Attorney General's office has issued a regulation limit-
ing board control in conversions to: (a) two years after the clos-
ing, in eviction plans, or whenever unsold shares (units) consti-
tute less than 50% of the shares (common interests), whichever
occurs sooner, and (b) five years, in noneviction plans, or when-
ever the unsold shares (units) constitute less than 50% of the
shares (common interests), whichever occurs sooner."0  The
power of the Attorney General to impose this limit is not clear,
although it has not yet been challenged. Moreover, courts have
interpreted the regulation to merely prohibit the sponsor from
designating a majority of the board.5 ' There is no requirement
that a majority of the board be elected by unit owners other than
the sponsor.
(b) Create At-Risk Developments
After declaring a plan effective, the sponsor becomes the
41 Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 160 N.E.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. 1959) (holding a
cooperative sales agreement void where there was no approval by the cooperative
corporation).
," Other states do limit developer control over the board. Florida, for example,
requires a certain percentage of board members to be elected by "unit owners other
than the developer." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.301(1) (West 1988); id. § 719.301(1)
(limiting developer control to a maximum of seven years); see also UNIF. CON-
DOMMINI ACT § 3-103(c) & (d) (1977).
0 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, §§ 18.3(v)(5), 23.3(w)(1) (1995). In
newly constructed or vacant structures, board control is limited to two years or
whenever unsold shares (units) constitute less than 50% of the shares (common in-
terest), whichever occurs sooner. See id §§ 21.3(s)(1)(xii), 20.3(u)(1).
r' See Park Briar Assocs. v. Park Briar Owners, Inc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274
(App. Div. 1992) (stating that the Attorney General's regulation does not alter such
conclusion); Rego Park Gardens Assocs. v. Rego Park Owners, Inc., 570 N.Y.S.2d
550, 551 (App. Div. 1991) (indicating that a sponsor's voting rights are valid absent
proof that the elected board members were on the sponsor's own slate or received
compensation from the sponsor).
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owner of the unsold units and is required to meet the financial
obligations which attach to those units. 2 A significant financial
drain was created in some developments, particularly coopera-
tive developments, since rents received by the sponsor for unsold
units were far below the monthly maintenance payable to the co-
operative housing corporation. This is especially true for units
that are subject to rent stabilization-almost all of the converted
units within the City of New York. For example, at Hyde Park
Gardens, Kew Gardens Hills, New York, the difference between
rents received and maintenance payable, on 489 unsold units,
was $112,177 per month.53 At Boulevard Gardens, Woodside,
New York, the difference, on 543 unsold units, was $98,192 per
month. 4 In these developments, the sponsors eventually de-
faulted due to an inability to make up this shortfall over an ex-
tended period of time. In times of high demand, the market pre-
vented sponsor default. Unsold units were sold at a profit on a
continuing basis and such profits offset the financial drain
caused by units yet unsold. However, when the market no
longer provided this safety net, sponsors were forced to default
on maintenance obligations owed to the cooperative corporation.
My study of financial difficulties focuses on the period of
time between 1989-93. During this time period serious financial
difficulties surfaced, and unit owners lobbied for legislative in-
tervention. By 1989, the risk of loss documented above was
transformed into actual and significant losses for a large number
of individuals.55 The number of sponsors defaulting on mainte-
nance obligations is supplied by filings made with the New York
State Department of Law, Real Estate Financing Bureau. On
December 12, 1989, sponsors were alerted to the need to file an
amendment to offering plans in the event of a default in their fi-
nancial obligations.56 In January of 1990, it was reported that
52 See Lim, supra note 41, at 355 (explaining the sponsor's responsibility to
make payments on the units it retains).
See Twenty-Fifth Amendment To Offering Plan, Hyde Park Gardens, Dated
Aug. 22, 1990, at 4.
See Fifteenth Amendment to Offering Plan, Boulevard Gardens Complex,
May 31, 1990.
See Andree Brooks, As Market Struggles, So Do Some Co-op Buildings, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1990, at 1 (discussing severe financial trouble faced by 88 co-ops,
affecting approximately 900 units).
5 See Letter from Frederick K. Mehiman, Asst. Attorney General, Real Estate
Financing Bureau to Attorney (Dec. 12, 1989).
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eighty-eight buildings faced financial difficulties due to sponsor
defaults. By May of 1990, this figure rose to 235 buildings. In
December of 1990, the figure had become 300 buildings, and then
rose to 325 buildings by March of 1991. By March 1993, the New
York State Department of Law had been notified of approxi-
mately one thousand buildings and developments in the State in
which there were financial problems.57
Due to these financial defaults and difficulties, unit pur-
chasers were placed at risk and in some cases lost their equity
investment. First, some cooperative housing corporations were
unable to pay debt service on underlying mortgages. This led to
some foreclosures. Foreclosure of an underlying mortgage in a
cooperative development leads to the dissolution of the coopera-
tive." Unit purchasers lose all property rights, both their equity
investment and their leasehold interest as unit purchasers.
However, if they financed the purchase of the unit, they remain
personally liable to repay the unpaid balance of their debt.
Thus, they suffer an actual out-of-pocket financial loss at least
equal to the purchase price of their unit. In recent years, several
foreclosure proceedings have been completed. 9 Attorneys esti-
mate that hundreds of cooperatives defaulted on their underly-
67 See JOCELYNE CHAIT, UNRAVELING THE MYTH: CO-OP CONvERSION IN NEW
YORK CITY 1987 TO 1990 at 89 (1993) (interviewing Gary Connor, chief of the Real
Estate Financing Bureau of the New York State Department of Law).
0 See Peter Grant, Foreclosures Deepen Crisis in N.Y. Co-ops, CRAINS N.Y.
Bus., Mar. 11, 1991, at 1 (explaining the agreement in the legal community that,
upon foreclosure, the co-op dissolves and the building returns to a rental).
"9 See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. New York State Div. of Hous. and
Community Renewal, 854 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (involving an 86 unit coop-
erative at 101 Lincoln Road, Brooklyn, N.Y.) affd, 83 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 1996); De
Santis v. White Rose Assocs., 578 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (involving purchas-
ers of a 24-unit cooperative who lost their investment); Shawn G. Kennedy, For
Troubled Co-ops, the Workout Rx N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, § 10, at 8 (discussing
two foreclosures); see also Brooks supra note 55, at 1 ("If the troubled buildings go
into foreclosure or bankruptcy, buyers could be left with worthless investments,
something that has not occurred in New York since the Depression ... .") (quoting
Harold Lubell, Chairman of the Co-op and Condominium Committee of the Real
Property Section of the New York State Bar Association); Trouble in the Heights:
Co-op Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIIES, Feb. 9, 1992, § 10, at 1 (discussing what is believed
to be the first bankruptcy of its kind in New York City, in which the co-op corpora-
tion at 867 West 181st Street in Manhattan filed for protection from its creditors
under chapter 11). Actually, in the 1970s, a cooperative located at 2 East 86th
Street, the Hotel Adams, was subject to a foreclosure sale, and by agreement the
former cooperative units reverted to rent stabilized status. See Daniel Wise, Fore-
closure Ordered for East Side Co-op; Sponsor Defaults on Mortgage Payments, N.Y.
L.J., Feb. 13, 1991, at 1.
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ing mortgages, and the New York State Attorney General's Of-
fice reported that, as of March 1991, ten lenders had initiated
foreclosure actions.0
Second, unit purchasers have seen their equity interest in
the cooperative-their interest above the unpaid balance on unit
loans-vanish.6 ' This is due to steep cuts in offering prices for
yet unsold units, and public unwillingness to purchase into de-
velopments plagued with financial difficulties. Often, the steep
price cuts have resulted from lending institutions "foreclosing"
on unit loans secured by unsold units pledged by sponsors. The
total number of units to which lenders have taken title after
sponsor defaults is unknown. One sponsor, Time Equities, re-
ported that 3,200 of the 4,000 unsold units owned by it were
taken by unit lenders.62  Another, Coronet Capital Corp., re-
ported that 1,300 unsold units owned by it were taken by unit
lenders.63 After taking title, the lending institutions sought to
dispose of the units but were able to do so only at deep discounts.
The deep discounts have not been temporary. While the market
value of units has rebounded somewhat, the rebound has not re-
stored unit purchasers' cash equity investment.
The market response has been reported in these terms:
The negative publicity surrounding the defaults increased buyer
resistance and lender reluctance to finance unit purchases, and
co-op prices went into free-fall.... In some cases, prices
dropped 50 percent or more from late-1980s highs.
Now, however, co-op prices appear to have hit bottom. And in
scattered instances, they are starting to rise. At Crescent
Woods in Bethpage, the price of sponsor-owned one-bedroom
units sank from a peak of $90,000 to $40,000 in 1991, said Bar-
bara Ford, president of Phase II Lifestyles Unlimited, a Floral
Park business that markets co-ops. Today they start at about
$60,000. ...
Evidence of loss of equity is provided by examining amend-
60 See Grant, supra note 58, at 1.
6'1 See Joe Catalano, Road to Recovery: Lenders Involved in Turnarounds Hope
Stronger Finances will Boost Co-op Sales, NEWSDAY, July 6, 1991, at 30 (discussing
Hyde Park Gardens).See Alan S. Oser, Recasting Rental Apartments as Co-ops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1991, § 10, at 3.
6See Grant, supra note 58, at 1.
Joe Catalano, Vital Signs: Long Island's Co-op Market, Comatose For Years, is
Hinting at Recovery, NEWSDAY, Mar. 17, 1995, at D1.
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ments to filed offering documents with the New York State De-
partment of Law. The experience at Hyde Park Gardens exem-
plifies the loss suffered by unit purchasers. That deyelopment
was a conversion of a 764 unit complex to cooperative ownership.
The offering plan was accepted for filing in September of 1986.
It was declared effective in May 1987 with 120 units sold-
16.15% of all units. 6 The subsequent shortfall between rents re-
ceived by sponsor on unsold units and maintenance obligations is
documented above. As a result, the sponsor defaulted in pay-
ment of maintenance as of January 1989-with public disclosure
of default, via an amendment to the offering plan, made in June
1989. This led to a default on payment of the underlying mort-
gage as of November 1989-with public disclosure of the default,
via an amendment to the offering plan, made in August 1990. A
workout ultimately was agreed to by the mortgagee, which also
resulted in steep declines in the offering prices of unsold units.
That decline is documented in Table D, which is based upon all
promotions (price reductions, closing cost adjustments, and fix-
up allowances) offered in the plan and any amendments until the
plan was declared effective.
Table D
HYDE PARK GARDENS
Lowest Price Payable By Purchasers
On or Before Date Plan Declared Effective
- By Tenants $196.14 per share
- By Nontenants $222.20 per share
Price Payable By Purchasers After Workout
For Vacant Unit $135.00 per share
Percentage Change on Sale Price
Obtainable For Vacant Unit on Resale
- By Original Tenant Purchasers 31.17 percent decrease
- By Original Nontenant Purchasers 39.24 percent decrease
The decline evidenced in Table D is the minimum loss expe-
rienced, since it is based on the assumption of purchase at the
lowest price offered at any time prior to the date the plan was
declared effective. Some purchasers paid higher prices, both be-
6 See Eighth Amendment to Offering Plan, Hyde Park Gardens, May 11, 1987,
at 2.
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fore and after the plan was declared effective. The loss experi-
enced-more than 31% for tenant purchasers and more than
39% for nontenant purchasers-would wipe out all of the unit
purchasers' equity.
An argument could be made that the decline in prices was
due in whole or in part to the general decline in demand as a re-
sult of the general downturn in the real estate market. How-
ever, the evidence does not support this conclusion. Table E
compares the price paid by tenants at the time the plan for Hyde
Park was declared effective, with subsequent prices offered for
vacant units until the date a workout was arranged. This pro-
vides evidence of the effect of market changes on the investment
made by a tenant-purchaser. Table F compares the price paid by
nontenants at the time the plan was declared effective, with sub-
sequent prices offered for vacant units until the date a workout
was arranged. This provides evidence of the effect of market
changes on the investment by a nontenant-purchaser. All fig-
ures are based upon the amendments filed to the offering plan.
Table E
COMPARISON OF PRICES PAID BY TENANTS AND
PRICES FOR NONTENANTS (VACANT UNITS) PRIOR TO
WORKOUT
Change from 1987 Price
Date Price to Tenants
1987 (lowest price to tenants
prior to declaration of effec- $196.14
tiveness)
May 1988
(price to nontenants) $271.78 38.56% Increase
September 1988
(price to nontenants) $279.40 42.45% Increase
June 1989
(price to nontenants) $260.00 32.56% Increase
1990 (price to nontenants) $260.00 32.56% Increase
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Table F
CHANGES IN PRICES TO NONTENANTS PRIOR TO WORK-
OUT
Change from 1987 Price to
Date Price Nontenants
1987 (lowest price prior to
declaration of effectiveness) $222.20
May 1988 $271.78 22.31% Increase
September 1988 $279.40 25.74% Increase
June 1989 $260.00 17.01% Increase
1990 $260.00 17.01% Increase
Tables E and F document that both tenants and nontenants
did not suffer a loss in their equity due to general market condi-
tions-rather, market conditions would have caused them to suf-
fer merely a decline in the overall appreciation in value they had
earlier experienced."
Steep price cuts have resulted not only from cuts introduced
by lender, but from an inability to find buyers willing to pur-
chase into a development plagued with financial difficulties. At
times, resales have become impossible in the face of sponsor de-
faults. Evidence of this effect can only be provided by individual
experience. For example, at Tudor City in Manhattan, after the
sponsor reported financial difficulties meeting maintenance obli-
gations, it was reported that the "[t]he initial reaction of the
residents was terror.... For a year, you couldn't sell a unit
here."67 Similarly, at 305 Eighth Avenue, Brooklyn, New York,
after the sponsor defaulted and maintenance doubled as a result,
a unit owner reported that he did not even try to sell after being
transferred to Rhode Island " 'because nobody would even think
' This conclusion is confirmed by aggregate market data on resales of condo-
minium units-which have experienced far fewer sponsor defaults, in which sponsor
default does not cause risk of foreclosure and loss by all unit owners, and for which
reliable aggregate date is available because information on prices of all unit trans-
fers is publicly available. Data gathered by Yale Robbins, Inc., on sales of condomin-
ium units in Manhattan, reveals that average unit sale prices declined slightly be-
tween 1989 and 1990, but were far higher in 1990 than they had been in 1988. See
Alan S. Oser, Shedding the Landlord Role, Gradually, N.Y. TIMES § 10, June 7,
1992, § 10, at 5. In other words, for a pre-1988 unit purchaser there would have
been only a loss of some of the appreciated value.
67See Catalano, supra note 61, at 30 (quoting Mary Frances Shaughnessy, man-
aging director of Tudor Realty Services Corp.).
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of buying until we sort ourselves out.' ""
Third, unit purchasers have faced an inability to sell their
units at any price. In part, this is due to the unwillingness of
purchasers to purchase when a development is faced with finan-
cial difficulties, as discussed above. Additionally, it is due to
lending institutions refusing to make loans secured by individual
cooperative units unless the sponsor owns less than 50% of the
units in the development.6 9 To document this second impedi-
ment, in February and June of 1992, I surveyed 117 bank and
thrift institutions conducting a residential lending business
within the City of New York. Responses were received from
fifty-six institutions-47.86 percent. Of these, twenty-seven re-
ported that they did not currently offer loans secured by individ-
ual cooperative units. Eight of the twenty-seven had offered
such loans as of January 1990, but had discontinued making
such loans.7 1 Of the twenty-nine respondents offering loans se-
cured by individual cooperative units, twenty-five (86%) reported
a loan policy requirement that 50% or more of the units in the
cooperative must have been sold by the sponsor in order for a
purchaser to qualify for financing. In fact, sixteen of the respon-
dents (55%) reported that 70% or more of the units must have
been sold to qualify for financing. At the end of March, 1993, I
updated some of this data in preparation for field hearings on fi-
nancing problems of housing cooperatives conducted by members
of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee.
At that time telephone follow-ups were conducted with the four
financial institutions which had earlier indicated that bank pol-
'8 Brooks, supra note 55, at 1 (quoting Randall Carnahan, insurance broker and
former co-op president).69 See Suzanne Christy, In a Class by Themselves, NEWSDAY, May 1, 1993, at 34
("Most banks won't even consider financing a unit sale in a building that hasn't sold
at least half of the units .... ).70 The reasons given for withdrawal from the market were: The difficulty of
selling the loans in the secondary market, the dramatic decline in values, economic
conditions and slowness of sales, a desire to further diversify the property held as
collateral based on considerations of prudence in the current market, and a decision
to respect portfolio lending to properties in the bank's CRA delineated lending area.
The difficulty of meeting the requirement imposed by purchasers in the secondary
market is due, in part, to the requirement that at least 70% of the units must have
been sold to owner-occupants or second home purchasers. See, e.g., Federal National
Mortgage Association, Selling Guide 846-49 (1993) (requiring 80% sales in Type 1
projects-in which lenders make final determinations that the project satisfies eli-
gibility criteria-and 70% sales requirement in Type 2 projects-which are submit-
ted to FNMA for review and acceptance).
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icy did not prevent the making of unit loans when less than 50%
of the units had been sold. As of March 1993, two of the four
were no longer making cooperative unit loans, and one now re-
quired 70% or more of the units to be sold in order for a unit pur-
chaser to qualify for financing. That left only one institution
which would consider financing in developments in which less
than 50% of the units had been sold, and even that institution
indicated it was interested in making only a few cooperative unit
loans."'
The risk of actual substantial financial loss should compel
legislative activity before such losses and hardships result.72 The
potential effect on tens of thousands of individuals would cer-
tainly justify legislative intervention. However, the legislature
was not responsive in either case.
B. The Market As A Protective Scheme
A full disclosure approach relies on the market for protection
of unit purchasers. The first line of protection should be the pur-
chasers themselves, who assess the risks disclosed in a particu-
lar market transaction and voluntarily choose to assume those
risks. The second line of protection should be afforded by insti-
tutional players who are needed for the market to operate, and
who provide an assessment of disclosed risks and screen those
which are excessive. The final line of protection should be the
market itself, where future sales serve as a safety net for past
71 In response to two years of meetings with Queens Borough President Claire
Shulman and field hearings called by Congressman Charles Schumer, a member of
the Housing Banking Committee, the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) unveiled a pilot program in October, 1993, which was limited to the City of
New York. See Catalano, supra note 64, at D1. FNMA agreed to the purchase of co-
op loans in the secondary market in which 51% or more of the units had been sold,
but only if the development was otherwise financially sound. See id. (noting that in
1994 Fannie Mae changed its co-op underwriting guidelines, reducing the minimum
percentage of units sold to 51% from 80%). The changes may help to make financing
more available for some developments.
72 The precise number of units in buildings suffering financial losses due to
sponsor defaults has not been calculated by the New York State Department of Law.
The conclusion that losses were experienced by tens of thousands of unit owners is
based on (a) the number of buildings which the Department of Law revealed had re-
ported financial defaults--one thousand, and (b) the average number of units con-
tained in offering plans that have been declared effective from 1985 through 1989-
approximately 67.6 units per plan. There is a way to calculate the total number of
units that remain unsold, but it is apparent that the number of unit purchasers in
buildings suffering financial difficulties due to sponsor default is substantial.
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risk assessments which are proven incorrect. The post-1985 ex-
perience with unit developments in New York State reveals that
all three market-based protections failed. That failure calls into
question exclusive reliance on a disclosure approach.
1. Can Unit Purchasers Protect Themselves?
Certain risks are unable to be adequately disclosed and as-
sessed because their existence and scope are incapable of being
known before the fact. For this type of risk, self-protection
through disclosure is not feasible. At a minimum, New York's
Martin Act should be amended to depart from a reliance on fall
disclosure for this type of risk. The sales figures in noneviction
plans which unit purchasers must accept at closing is an exam-
ple of this type of risk. What is disclosed is the minimum unit
sales which permit the plan to be declared effective (15%) and
the maximum sales (80%) requiring the plan to be declared ef-
fective. The actual sales in the development in which unit pur-
chasers are legally bound to become a part is unknown and
therefore undisclosed. It also cannot be adequately projected by
the unit purchasers, due to lack of information and because sales
experience will vary from building to building and from time to
time.
There is no statutory right to rescind a unit purchase
agreement if actual sales fall short of some stipulated amount,
e.g., an amount which would ensure the financial stability of the
building. Protection through rescission or raising the minimum
sales required to declare a plan effective, are necessary substan-
tive protections and would free purchasers from their reliance on
a pure disclosure model.
There is another reason to depart from a pure disclosure
model which applies to other types of risks, including those
which can be disclosed. The experience in the field of condomin-
ium and cooperative unit offerings is that unit purchasers do not
understand the risks disclosed in the offering plan. The difficul-
ties faced by consumers who are asked to protect themselves by
gathering and judging information, including consumers in the
house hunting process, have been documented.73 One demon-
73 See Jeff Sovern, Toward A Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes:
Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Con-
sumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13, 14-23 (documenting the
evolution of consumers' rights from the days of caveat emptor through the rules of
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strated barrier to effective self-protection is information over-
load.74 This is prevalent in the coop-condominium purchase
process, due to its reliance on a lengthy and, in part, complicated
disclosure document (offering plan). Other barriers are probabil-
ity assessments, 5 which are essential in co-op/condominium of-
ferings through predictions of future financial obligations.
Experienced individuals in the field of co-op/condominium of-
ferings agree that individual consumers cannot be expected to
understand an offering plan, and that they require expert assis-
tance from attorneys, accountants, and real estate salespeople. 6
While most buyers obtain the assistance of counsel, the assis-
tance of other experts-e.g., accountants-is rarely sought.
Moreover, given the cognitive barriers to appreciation of risks,
one wonders if the assistance of counsel is effectively assisting
purchasers in adequately perceiving and evaluating the risks of
purchase. An example of disclosure not serving the purpose of
individual perception and adequate assessment was recently
provided. It dealt with the expiration of ten-year real estate tax
abatement programs, which led to soaring condominium carrying
costs.
Many buyers may not have understood that they would
eventually have significant tax increases when the abatement
expired, real estate lawyers said, despite requirements by the
Attorney General's Office that the workings of the program be
spelled out clearly to prospective buyers.
"Were they fully warned by the Attorney General?" asked
Kevin B. McGrath, a partner at Graubard and Mollen. 'Were
they told by their lawyer? Yes and probably yes."
"Did they understand it? Probably not," he concluded, add-
ing that "human nature precluded their understanding it."77
tort law until the relatively recent development of the doctrine of implied warran-
ties).
74 See id. at 27-30 (suggesting that customers who are given a plethora of infor-
mation in a short time often make less effective decisions).
76 See id. at 33-35 (informing that studies show many people assess probabilities
by relying on heuristics, or approaches, that sometimes lead them seriously astray,
thus, buyers often "choose not to purchase homes with warranties because they er-
roneously believe that their houses will not be defective.").
76 See George W. Goodman, To Understand a Prospectus, Experts Say, Get Ex-
pert Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1981, § 8, at 14 (noting that it is a difficult task for
a layjperson to interpret a prospectus).
Tracie Rozhon, As A Tax Break for Some Condos Ebbs, Costs Soar, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 1994, § 9, at 5.
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2. Do Institutional Participants Protect Unit Purchases?
In securities regulation generally, it is sometimes admitted
that the small investor does not understand the prospectus and,
therefore, is not protected by a full disclosure approach.7" How-
ever, institutional participants and other sophisticated investors,
are thought to understand the risks disclosed and to protect all
others by their influence over the offering price. This is not true
in offerings of condominium and cooperative interests.
Institutional participants in this market are the lenders who
provide financing for the project, both unit loans and, in coop-
eratives, underlying mortgages.79 Such participants can shape
the terms of the offering in order to reduce risks-e.g., establish
a higher than 15% unit sales requirement to qualify for financ-
ing. However, unlike institutional participants in the securities
market, these institutional participants are not cast in the same
role as the small investor-they are not unit (securities) pur-
chasers. As a result, they have no interest in self-management.
Moreover, while they are interested in protecting their collateral,
the protections they imposed in the pre-1989 period were not
necessarily the requirements unit purchasers would need for
protection of their investment. In part this was based on recent
experience regarding market value. However, it was also based
on market trade-offs, e.g., favorable financing decisions in ex-
change for additional fees or higher interest rates.
For example, before financial difficulties surfaced in 1989
not all lenders required evidence that sponsors' financial condi-
tion was strong enough to make default unlikely. As reported in
78 See Homer Kripke, Where Are We On Securities Disclosure After the Advisory
Committee Report?, 6 SEC. REGS. L.J. 99, 103-04 (1978) (noting that investors in the
securities field, as determined by survey, functioned more like an analyst; however,
it is also noted that the sample may have been unrepresentative and thus unreli-
able); Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631, 632
(1973) (positing that "even an expert [could not] get a solid understanding as long as
disclosure is circumscribed by the push to make the prospectus short and readable
for the layman"); Peter D. Santori, Selling Investment Company Shares Via an Off-
The-Page Prospectus: "Leveling the Playing Field" or "Diminishing Investor Protec-
tion", 20 J. CORP. L. 245, 274 (1995) (recognizing that "in most cases and for various
reasons, statutory prospectuses contain so much information that the average in-
vestor does not give the prospectus any review whatsoever, much less the review it
deserves.").
7" See J. Cary Barton & Robert E. Morrison, Equity Participation Arrangements
Between Institutional Lenders and Real Estate Developers, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929,
934 (1981).
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1990, "for the first time, some lenders are looking into the spon-
sor's finances when the number of unsold shares is high ....
Lenders want to see if a sponsor's pockets are deep enough to
continue paying maintenance fees."" In addition, only after fi-
nancial difficulties surfaced did most lenders require a high per-
centage of units to be sold. The secondary market long required
70 to 80% of the units to be sold, but lenders made loans to de-
velopments which did not meet these pre-sale requirements.8"
As discussed earlier in this article, after 1989 lenders imposed a
sale requirement of at least 50%. It was reported in 1991 that
"[i]n situations where a sponsor owns 50 percent or more of the
shares in a co-op, lenders are out of the market entirely.... "82
Furthermore, lenders allowed sponsors to obtain loans se-
cured by unsold units. They often valued those units based on
the insider price." But, this was not universally true. Rather,
"[w]hen the market was at its height two years ago [1988], many
occupied units were financed for as much as 50 percent of the
full market value they would have had if vacant. Now, many
such units are worth even less."84
3. Does the Re-Sale Market Protect the Unit Purchaser?
There are two distinct aspects to the resale market experi-
ence and its role in protecting unit purchasers. The first is the
market experience faced by the sponsor. In the early 1980s,
sponsors relied on future sales to generate revenues needed to
meet the shortfalls between rents received and unit ownership
obligations (maintenance or assessments)." Few plans were
go Joe Catalano, Condos and Co-ops Insights: Chilly Co-op Loan Market,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1990, at 11, available in 1990 WL 3318411 (statement of Robert
Corso, mortgage broker).
"' See Alan S. Oser, Financing Is Available In A Variety of Forms, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1984, at 45 (stating that for projects that do not meet Fannie Mae guide-
lines there is usually a quarter-point to a half-point additional cost to the loan).
82 Thomas J. Lueck, Lenders Tightening Screws on Co-ops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1991, § 10 at 1 (statement of Sheldon Gartenstein, regional manager of the National
Cooperative Bank).
See Alvin I. Appelberg, Co-op Converters (Letters to the Editor), N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 27, 1989, at 2.
84 Brooks, supra note 55, at 1.
' See, e.g., Joe Catalano, Sponsor Defaults Growing Among Co-ops and Condos,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1990, § 3, at 11. (explaining how rents on vacant apartments
held by sponsors are lower than the maintenance charges thereby creating a nega-
tive cash flow).
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noneviction plans.86 In 1981, the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral's Office reported that only about one in six conversions oc-
curred pursuant to a noneviction plan.8 7 In eviction plans, non-
purchasing tenants (other than senior citizens) could be evicted
two years after the plan was declared effective.' The right and
power to evict, coupled with the market demand for units, al-
lowed the sale of almost all units in a short time.
Even the plans which were noneviction plans allowed the
market to operate. Sale of 30 to 40% of the units occurred as a
starting point89 -limiting the amount of shortfall for which a
sponsor was responsible after declaring the plan effective. Sub-
sequent sales occurred on an on-going basis, with a sell-out an-
ticipated in seven to ten years.90
The downturn in the market after 1987, however, impaired
the effectiveness of this safety net. This led to the financial diffi-
culties documented above, which, in turn, further eroded the
market safety net as unit prices fell substantially and interest in
unit ownership waned. By December, 1989:
Lawyers in the field made it clear... that the reasons sponsors
are having trouble meeting their obligations when they have
pledged their unsold shares is that in a slow market sales of
those apartments that do become vacant are few and far be-
tween.
Without the sales... they lack the means to meet their obli-
gations-to the banks that hold their unsold shares as security
See id. (discussing how negative cash flow is due in part to conversions done
with noneviction plans).
See Betsy Brown, The 'Friendlier' Noneviction Co-ops, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18,
1981, § 22, at 10.
s See 1979 N.Y. Laws 432 (defining an eviction plan as "[a] plan which, pursu-
ant to the provisions of any law or regulation governing rentals and continuing oc-
cupancy, can result in the eviction of a non-purchasing tenant by reason of the ten-
ant failing to purchase pursuant thereto."); 1978 N.Y. Laws 544 (providing that "no
eviction proceedings will be commenced against non-purchasing tenants for a period
of two years after the plan is declared effective"). In 1982-83, the time period after
which evictions could occur was changed to three years. One estimate, made in
1981, was that in buildings subject to eviction plans, about 15% of the tenants move
out, 80% buy, and the remainder-5%/--are persons protected from eviction by law.
See Brown, supra note 87, at 10.
"' See Alan S. Oser, The Noneviction Conversion Finds Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 1981, § B, at 4 (citing experience of Robert Ettinger, a leading sponsor of nonevic-
tion conversions in describing his approach towards selling condominium units to
tenants).
90 See id.
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interest on loans and to the cooperatives for maintenance, which
in may instances could be substantially in excess of the rental
income from the tenants who declined to buy their apartments.91
The lesson of the 1980s is that the market safety net is un-
reliable. It works best when it is needed the least (when sales
are brisk) and it fails when it is most needed.
A second resale market experience is the experience of the
unit purchasers who find they have become a part of a very risky
enterprise. Sale, at a partial or full loss, is the market's safety
net. In the cooperative and condominium market, however, it is
not a safety net in fact. First, as documented above, sales are
not always possible at any price. Again, when the safety net is
most needed, it vanishes. Second, loss means not just loss of a
cash investment. There remains a large unit loan, typically two
or three times as large as the unit purchaser's cash investment.
Unit owners are often unable to discharge this large debt, mak-
ing sale impossible even if a buyer is available.
One example of this phenomena was reported in 1995, many
years after financial difficulties surfaced and unit prices
dropped.
Despite... positive signs for the market, some co-op owners are
still unable to sell and feel trapped. Charles and Linda Matson
purchased a two-bedroom unit seven years ago for $72,000 at
Village in the Woods in Selden. The Matsons estimate their
unit is worth $25,000; the unit next door went for $20,000 last
month at a foreclosure sale.
The Matsons have few complaints about the complex, which
they say is financially stable and well maintained. However,
the couple has two sons, and the family needs more space. Still,
the Matsons have not tried to sell the unit, partly because
they've seen few sales at the complex and partly because they
have a $50,000 mortgage balance. If they sold for $25,000, they
would have to pay another $25,000 to the lender to satisfy the
loan.
92
C. Path Dependence
Did the New York Legislature respond when confronted with
the weaknesses of reliance on a market-oriented approach
91 Daniel Wise, Cash Woes Hit Co-op Converter, Tudor City Sponsor Cites Slow
Sales for Apartments, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12, 1989, at 1.
"2 See Catalano, supra note 64, at D1.
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(premised on self-protection through disclosure)? Did it alter,
even incrementally, reliance on a disclosure approach? In 1990
and 1991, unit owners, assisted by local government officials,
lobbied for protective legislation."3 "Unit purchasers (owners)
asked for amendments to the Martin Act to provide them with
substantive protections, such as escrow or bond requirements for
developers' financial obligations and a requirement that control
over the board be turned over to unit owners within a specified
period."9 4 Yet the small measure of relief which was adopted in
the years following the financial crisis which surfaced in 1989,
was a bill allowing cooperative and condominium boards to col-
lect rents directly from tenants when the unit owners (e.g. the
sponsor as holder of unsold shares) default.95
One recent bill, adopted in 1997, has recognized that unit
purchasers require substantive protections, not merely the pro-
tection of disclosure.96 It authorized condominiums to obtain fi-
nancing secured by common expenses." However, newly built or
newly converted condominiums were not authorized to borrow in
the first five years of their existence. The five year restriction
was "meant to prevent a condo's sponsor ... from making im-
provements, paying himself back and leaving the owners with a
large debt. This happened to many co-ops in the mid-'80s, leav-
ing them in financial trouble."" This has been one departure
from reliance on disclosure for protection of unit purchasers.
However, past experience does not suggest this is a first step in
an incremental evolution away from reliance on a disclosure ap-
proach.
Analysis of the reasons more protective measures were not
passed is beyond the scope of this article.99 The outcome, how-
ever, evidences path dependence. Far fewer investors experi-
93 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 17, at 466.
94 Id.
9" See 1991 N.Y. Laws 594; see also 1992 N.Y. Laws 104 (permitting any board
member to file a lien for unpaid condominium charges); 1992 N.Y. Laws 172
(exempting a cooperative housing corporation from the New York gains tax when
the sponsor defaults and it takes over the unsold shares).
See 1997 N.Y. Laws 498.
97 See id.
98 Joe Catalano, Law: Condo Boards Can Borrow Money, NEWSDAY, Sept. 26,
1997, at C7.
"See Di Lorenzo, supra note 17, at 465-66 (including the opposition of Senate
leadership who believed the matter should be left in the hands of market forces
rather than addressed through legislation).
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enced losses in the late 1950s as a result of abusive real estate
syndication offerings than experienced losses in the period after
1989 as a result of cooperative offerings without substantive le-
gal protections. Yet, the former led to legislative action in 1960,
while the latter led to relative inaction in the 1990s. Despite
evidence that disclosure was not adequately serving the legisla-
tive purpose of protecting unit purchasers, the legislature did not
depart from this legislative approach.
CONCLUSION
In 1960, New York embraced a full disclosure approach to-
ward offerings of cooperative and condominium units to the gen-
eral public. This decision was based on the history of securities
regulation and a belief, at that time, that disclosure would ade-
quately protect unit purchasers. In the last ten years, this belief
has been contradicted by the facts. Yet, to date the New York
Legislature has not departed from its historical path.
The need for departure from the disclosure approach is the
message of this article. Yet, what sort of substantive protections
should be adopted? This article proposes that the terms and
conditions required for viable operation of a bona fide coopera-
tive-condominium development should be stipulated rather than
left to market forces. This includes financial soundness and ef-
fective self-management. A requirement that board control be in
the hands of resident unit owners, which has been embraced in
Florida and other states, is an example of a substantive protec-
tion which serves the goal of effective self-management. A re-
quirement that a substantial share of the units must be sold,"0
and that the sponsor provide adequate financial guarantees for
warranties made in the offering,01 both of which have been im-
posed in California, are examples of substantive protections
which serve the aim of financial soundness. The precise sub-
stantive protections to be adopted is a matter to be determined.
100 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.9 (1998) (requiring eighty percent of in-
terests to be sold, or providing security to assure fulfillment of the subdivider's obli-
gations as owner).
'0' See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 11018(i) (Deering 1984) (requiring "adequate
financial arrangements" to be made "for any guaranty or warranty included in the
offering"); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.14 (1991) (stating legal or finan-
cial arrangements shall assure that ownership and possession rights of a member of
a stock cooperative are not adversely affected by foreclosure of blanket encumbrance
when the member is not delinquent in payments).
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The conclusion of this article, however, is that substantive pro-
tections are needed-departure from reliance on a pure disclo-
sure approach is warranted.
